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In the 1980s and 1990s, the German telecommunications industry appeared to be an 
important case study demonstrating continued cross-national divergence in institutions 
and employer strategies.  The union and works councils at the former monopolist 
Deutsche Telekom (DT) used their influence over strategic decision-making and 
regulatory reform to guide incremental adjustment to new technologies and more 
competitive markets (Turner 1991; Batt and Darbishire 1997; Katz and Darbishire 2000; 
Darbishire 2005).  DT, in turn, adopted ‘labor mediated’ restructuring strategies, which 
maintained high wages, stable jobs, and worker skills at a time when incumbent firms in 
the US and UK were pursuing ‘market mediated’ approaches that involved forced layoffs 
and deskilling (Katz 1997).   
Developments since the late 1990s have undermined many of these distinctive 
features of the German telecommunications market and contributed to growing 
fragmentation in national collective bargaining arrangements.  New regulations in 1998 
ended DT’s monopolies in all segments, encouraging the expansion of low-cost service 
providers with weaker, or no, collective agreements.  Following privatization, DT 
management has come under increased pressure to reorient the company towards 
maximizing shareholder value, at the same time that it faces declining market share and 
growing price-based competition.  This shift towards more liberalized markets, 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance, and non-union competition suggests growing 
convergence on the conditions incumbent providers in liberal market countries like the 
US faced in the 1990s.  At the same time, other institutions have proven more resilient, 
including extensive co-determination rights, Germany’s ‘dual’ apprenticeship training 
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system, and strong union presence at DT – all of which have traditionally been viewed as 
key supports for worker participation in restructuring (Streeck 1991; Turner 1991).   
In this paper, I ask how, and to what extent, these persistent differences in 
markets and institutions have influenced the restructuring strategies of large German 
telecommunications firms.  Findings from national data and case studies suggest that 
institutional effects are increasingly varied at both the industry level and across 
establishments in lead firms’ production chains.  Despite bargaining decentralization, 
works councils at DT and its major competitors have been able to participate in work 
reorganization decisions and encourage management to invest in worker skill and 
participation.  However, a second trend of outsourcing and subsidiary strategies may 
allow firms to by-pass these institutions, leading to growing labor market segmentation 
and declining coordination between works councils. 
The following sections examine these restructuring trends and their effects at the 
industry, firm, and workplace levels.  Part 1 focuses on recent changes in market 
regulation and the structure of competition in the German telecommunications industry.  
Part 2 discusses the effects that these changes have had on collective bargaining 
structures and union responses.  Part 3 compares employment systems in core technician 
and customer service and sales jobs at Deutsche Telekom and its largest competitors.  
Part 4 examines the ways in which organizational restructuring, including outsourcing 
and new subsidiary strategies, is affecting job quality and labor market segmentation.  
Findings are based on over 150 interviews with union and works council representatives, 
managers, and employees conducted between 2003 and 2007; as well as secondary 
analysis of company documents and industry reports. 
 3
1. Market Liberalization and Industry Restructuring 
Deutsche Telekom (DT) remained a publicly owned company throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, retaining its monopolies in long distance and local phone services as well as the 
growing mobile, internet, and cable markets.  Deregulation and privatization initially 
occurred through a drawn-out series of legislative reforms guided by long and difficult 
negotiations among well organized interests.  Post Reform I went into effect in 1989 and 
separated the postal service, the post bank, and telecommunications services.  Mobile and 
satellite communications were opened to limited competition, but DT maintained its 
monopoly over network services.  In 1993, the European Council passed a directive 
calling for member states to eliminate the monopoly on network infrastructure and voice 
telephony services by 1998.  Germany responded with Post Reform II in 1995, which lay 
the groundwork for privatization of telecommunications and postal services.  The DBP-
controlled postal service, post bank, and telecommunications services were converted to 
private corporations, and the Deutsche Telekom AG was established as a joint-stock 
company with 100 percent state ownership.   
Despite these changes, by the mid-1990s DT still controlled around 90 percent of 
the data services market and 90 to 95 percent of the cable TV network  (Darbishire 1997: 
195).  DT also benefited from ‘asymmetrical’ regulation that gave the company a number 
of advantages, with low incentive price regulation and few limitations on cross 
subsidization or market entry (Darbishire, 1997: 195-196).  This changed in 1998, when 
legislation came into effect that ended DT’s remaining monopolies and placed new 
restrictions on DT with the aim of curbing its market power.  Almost overnight, the 
German telecommunications market shifted from one of the most protected to one of the 
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most liberalized in the world.  National network operators like Mannesmann Arcor and 
o.tel.o and smaller utilities and city carriers like Net Cologne or Worldcom/MFS 
expanded their own competing network infrastructure, targeting lucrative urban and 
corporate networks markets.  Service providers or resellers benefited from new rules that 
allowed them to sell network capacity from Deutsche Telekom at lower rates.1  
Intensified price competition in fixed network communications led to declining call 
charges, which fell more than 60 percent between 1998 and 2000, representing ‘the 
steepest cuts in any European market for years’ (Althaus 2000).  By 2006, prices in the 
international calls segment had declined to around 3 percent of the cost before 
liberalization (Bundesnetzagentur 2006: 76).   
At the same time, DT management became increasingly focused on raising the 
company’s lagging share price.  In 1996, DT made an initial public offering (IPO) and 
one million private investors purchased 26 percent of its stock.  State ownership was 
further eroded following second and third public offerings in 1999 and 2000.  By 2004, 
26 percent of shares were directly held by the federal government, with 17 percent held 
by the federal Loan Bank for Reconstruction.  Meanwhile, the price of DT shares fell to 
over 90 percent of their peak by 2002 (Economist 2002), putting additional pressure on 
the firm.   
Despite these changes, the German telecommunications market continued to be 
influenced by its distinctive institutions and development trajectory.  DT was able to 
maintain its diversified corporate structure and monopoly power, which have allowed it 
to remain the dominant provider across core market segments as well as in the growing 
multi-media services market.  It has been accused of using judicial review to delay or 
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block unfavorable regulatory decisions and leveraging its market power to delay 
provision of leased lines and to introduce artificially low ‘dumping prices’ in certain 
markets, such as DSL (OECD 2004: 59-60).  More recently, DT lobbied Germany’s 
coalition government to exempt new investments in its high speed fiber-optic network, 
VDSL, from regulation – allowing it to prevent competitors from using this network for a 
fixed period.  In 2006, the Bundesnetzagentur, backed by the EU, required DT to offer 
local loop unbundling on the network; however, in February 2007 a new clause in the 
German Telecommunications Act came into effect that exempted new markets from 
regulation.  The EU Commission has instituted breach-of-contract proceedings, arguing 
that these provisions conflict with the EU’s legal framework.  At the time of writing, this 
conflict had not yet been resolved.   
DT’s role in developing Germany’s telecommunications infrastructure also has 
given it a sustained competitive advantage in high-speed internet services.  The company 
did not invest in a competing cable network for voice and internet, instead promoting 
DSL services and expansion of its high speed integrated services digital network (ISDN).  
DT was forced to sell majority stakes in its nine regional cable companies in 2000, 
following the Cable Directive.  However, DT temporarily retained a ‘25 percent plus one 
vote’ share in each of these companies, which gave it veto rights over major restructuring 
decisions.  In addition, the direct customer connections continue to be owned and 
operated by a large number of small private companies, which has made it both complex 
and expensive for the large cable operators to invest in upgrading their infrastructure.  As 
a result, the cable network has not become a major competing source of broadband 
services, as it has in the US and the UK.2   
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Finally, the German telecommunications market has been relatively stable 
compared to that of other countries.  DT suffered from plummeting share price and 
revenue losses until 2003 when it finally managed to turn a profit.  Rapid growth after 
liberalization gave way to consolidation and tighter margins in the early 2000s.  
However, these growing pains were relatively minor compared to the accounting 
scandals, overbuilding of capacity, and plummeting share price that US 
telecommunications firms experienced at the end of the 1990s.  Despite a shift to a 
stronger ‘shareholder value’ orientation, Germany’s distinct corporate governance 
arrangements have continued to provide additional oversight over company finances and 
investment decisions by banks, institutional investors and employee representatives 
(Boersch 2007). 
These factors protected DT to some extent and allowed the company to maintain a 
dominant market position in most segments. However, it is increasingly disadvantaged by 
its high cost structure, large fixed infrastructure investments, and new regulations that 
seek to curb its monopoly power.  While other firms can ‘cherry pick,’ choosing to 
concentrate on high value-added market segments, DT has an obligation to provide 
universal service.  The company has a number of social obligations that create additional 
costs, including its continued employment of Beamten, or civil servants, from the 
Bundespost who enjoy special rights under German law; and a negotiated commitment to 
train thousands of new apprentices every year.3   Only 20 percent of apprentices get jobs 
at DT after completing their training, and thus DT’s competitors or subcontractors enjoy 
spillovers from this investment. 
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DT has also been slow to enter new, growing market segments.  Its fixed network 
business unit T-Com only began offering internet telephony, or Voice over IP (VoIP), in 
2005, long after AOL and Freenet had developed their own services.  DT also did not 
develop a ‘Triple Play’ of VoIP, internet, and broadband television services until the end 
of 2006, prompted by the loss of customers to competitors offering bundled services.  
These innovations were delayed by fears of short-term revenue loss from higher margin 
traditional telephone services, and implemented only after the online subsidiary T-Online 
was integrated into the fixed line operations at T-Com.  DT is currently suffering revenue 
losses from the contraction of this segment, due to substitution by mobile 
communications and, to a lesser degree, internet telephony.4 
These structural disadvantages and missed investment opportunities are 
increasingly hurting DT’s competitive position.  Its share of the telecommunications 
market fell from 70 percent in 1998 to 61 percent in 1999, and then to 54 percent in 2004; 
while its share in local telephone services has fallen around 30 percent since 1998.5  DT’s 
mobile subsidiary T-Mobile controls around 34 percent of the wireless market (See Table 
1), which after years of rapid growth has become increasingly saturated and price-
competitive. DT also controls around 50 percent of the growing internet market, where it 
competes with fixed-network and internet service providers such as Arcor, Freenet, 
Versatel, and Hansenet (See Table 2).6  In the past few years, DT has faced a more rapid 
hemorrhaging of customers, which declined by 1.5 million in 2006, and shrinking net 
profits, which dropped close to 60 percent in the first quarter of 2007.   
 
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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2. Effects of Restructuring on Industrial Relations 
These recent developments in the German telecommunications market have had wide-
ranging effects on collective bargaining, both within DT and in the industry as a whole.  
The Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (DPG) operated as a single-company enterprise union in 
the Deutsche Bundespost and then at DT, and enjoyed considerable influence over 
strategic decision-making through its close work with the union-dominated personnel 
councils and representation on the company’s advisory board.  In the 1990s, the DPG 
continued to enjoy close relationships with managers and works councilors.  Member 
density in core areas of the business remained high, at around 70 to 80 percent.  Close to 
50 percent of the former Bundespost’s employees were civil servants (Beamten), and thus 
enjoyed lifetime job security along with other special employment rights.   
In 2001 the DPG merged with four other service unions to form the conglomerate 
union ver.di, but the old leadership was given considerable autonomy within the new 
union’s telecommunications and IT division (Fachbereich 9).  Union membership 
remained high in traditional areas of the business, and union and works council 
representation on the company’s supervisory board gave ver.di sustained oversight in 
strategic decision-making.     
However, ver.di has been less successful in organizing new areas of the industry.  
Because DT was a monopoly, collective bargaining was organized at the enterprise level, 
and there was no established employers’ association or industry-level agreement.  The 
union attempted to establish sectoral bargaining following liberalization, but it was 
unable to do so for several reasons.  First, the DPG, and then ver.di, continued to be 
viewed as the union of Deutsche Telekom.  Local exchange carriers and competing 
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network operators were unwilling to cooperate with the former monopolist or its union, 
which continued to place a priority on protecting DT’s market position; and the 
employees of these firms were wary of joining a union that represented the interests of a 
competitor.  DT’s competitors formed the Association of Telecommunications and 
Value-Added Service Providers (VATM), but membership remains voluntary and the 
association has not sought to engage in collective bargaining. 
Second, the DPG faced competition from other unions as it sought to organize 
new firms.  As firms in the public, metalworking, chemical, and energy sectors 
diversified into telecommunications and IT, their unions sought to negotiate agreements 
with these new business units.  Today ver.di’s agreements outside of DT consist of cable 
providers formerly owned by DT, such as Kabel Deutschland; and city carriers like 
NetCologne that had agreements with the former public sector union ötv (See Table 3).   
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Organizational restructuring exacerbated the competition among unions, 
particularly between the metalworking union IG Metall and the new conglomerate 
service union ver.di.  The two unions both negotiated separate agreements with different 
operating subsidiaries of the DT group’s company T-Systems, which was formed when 
DT’s telecommunications and IT service division merged with Debis Systemhaus, a 
service division of the automaker DaimlerChrysler.  DT’s major fixed network 
competitor, Arcor, was formed through the mergers of subsidiaries that had separate 
agreements with IG Metall, Transnet, and IG BCE.  In 2000, the unions formally divided 
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responsibility for new telecommunications and IT companies.  However, this has not 
prevented conflict at a time of declining membership and changing firm boundaries.  For 
example, ver.di had agreed that the mobile phone subsidiary D2 Mannesmann Mobilfunk 
fell under IG Metall’s jurisdiction, but changed their position after the British company 
Vodafone took over Mannesmann.  These jurisdictional conflicts have prevented the 
unions from developing a coordinated strategy at the industry-level and divided works 
councils at the company-level.    
A third challenge to establishing sectoral bargaining has been the persistence of 
low union density in new industry segments.  Most small service re-sellers and internet 
service providers have not negotiated union agreements.  Larger competitors were either 
established by international firms that did not have a prior relationship with German 
unions or by diversified German firms that were reluctant to negotiate new agreements 
for their telecommunications subsidiaries.  D2 Mannesman Mobilfunk began negotiations 
with IG Metall in the mid-1990s, but did not conclude a collective agreement until 2001, 
after the company was taken over by Vodafone.  Membership has remained low, at 
around 5 percent, and in some regions works councilors have broken off all ties with the 
union.  Employees at the wireless provider E-plus elected works councils in the late 
1990s with ver.di’s assistance, but by 2007 union membership still remained low, union 
affiliation of the works councilors was fragmented, and there had been no progress 
toward an agreement.   
These three factors – distrust by new employers of DT’s close relationship with 
the DPG, competition between unions, and low union membership in new segments – 
help to explain the continued lack of a sectoral agreement.  More surprisingly, the DPG 
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also has not negotiated a common framework agreement for the companies in Deutsche 
Telekom’s corporate group, where the union continues to have a strong and 
institutionalized bargaining relationship with management.  As DT transitioned from a 
fixed network carrier to a diversified corporate group in the 1990s, the company 
established independent subsidiaries for different market segments and services.  In 2000, 
the corporate group shifted to a new divisional structure, based on DT’s four market 
‘pillars’ of T-Com (fixed network), T-Mobile (wireless), T-Systems (business and IT), 
and T-Online (internet services).  T-Com remained an internal division of the parent 
company, Deutsche Telekom AG, and thus retained the company’s original collective 
agreement.  However, the DPG concluded separate agreements with T-Mobile and T-
Systems and was unsuccessful in securing an agreement with T-Online.   
Negotiations between ver.di and T-Online ended in 2005 when DT announced 
that it would bring the subsidiary back into the parent company to take advantage of 
synergies between internet and network services.  At the same time time, the group 
within T-Com servicing small and medium-sized companies merged with T-System’s 
large business customers group to create a new business customer division.  DT has also 
established a number of subsidiaries that perform cross-divisional management functions 
or operating activities, and these are either covered by the parent company agreement 
(often with unique terms) or by separate agreements.  Ver.di representatives estimated in 
2007 that there were over 100 collective agreements across Deutsche Telekom. 
This fragmentation of collective bargaining within DT can be partially explained 
by the broader developments in the telecommunications industry discussed above.  Ver.di 
membership and works council ties have remained weaker in business units competing in 
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newer market segments: union density is around 70 to 80 percent in the parent company, 
but is estimated at 10 to 20 percent at T-Mobile and T-Systems and was close to 5 
percent in T-Online before it was re-integrated into the parent company.  Sako and 
Jackson (2006: 356-8) provide two additional explanations that are specific to DT.  First, 
the union merger that formed ver.di drained resources and diverted attention from newer 
DT operations, hampering membership recruitment and allowing works councils in these 
operations to assume a more central and independent role.  Second, pay and working 
conditions in the new business units were initially better than those at the parent 
company, as DT sought to encourage employees to accept transfers as well as to attract 
new employees with technical skills that were in high demand.  Works councils and 
employees in the subsidiaries thus had both the means and the incentive to maintain a 
structure of separate agreements.   
A more basic explanation for fragmentation in collective agreements is connected 
to DT’s unique history of enterprise unionism.  Because the DPG focused on one 
employer, it had established a tradition of formal collective bargaining for a number of 
topics that are typically included in works agreements in other sectors, such as scheduling 
practices and variable compensation.  As management sought to differentiate practices, 
union representatives preferred to negotiate separate agreements rather than shift 
responsibility to works councils through opening clauses.  This tradition was a source of 
labor strength in the 1970s and 80s, based on an unusually close relationship between the 
works councils and a single-employer union.  However, as DT has decentralized its own 
corporate structure, the formerly close relationships between works councils in different 
areas of the business have further broken down and both union and works council 
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representatives are responsible for administering increasingly complex collective 
agreements.  The corporate group’s works council plays a relatively weak role, dealing 
primarily with decisions that affect the entire group; while company-level works councils 
have primary responsibility for negotiating agreements on such matters as work design, 
job security, and compensation practices that are not covered in agreements with ver.di.  
As a result, ver.di has found it increasingly difficult to coordinate bargaining and 
participate in strategic decision-making at the corporate group level.   
Figures for membership density and bargaining coverage in the German 
telecommunications industry are not publicly available, and thus can only be roughly 
estimated.  In 2006, ver.di and works council representatives estimated 70 percent density 
in Deutsche Telekom’s broadband/fixed network operations and headquarters (with 
around 115,000 employees), an average of 40 percent in DT’s other subsidiaries (45,000 
employees), and 5 percent in new industry entrants (56,000 employees).7  Union density 
was thus at most 47 percent in 2006, falling from an estimated 57 percent in the mid-
1990s (Funk 2004).  Coverage of employees by firm-level collective bargaining 
agreements is still high, due to the continued dominance of DT across industry segments.  
Based on similarly rough calculations, it appears to have fallen from close to 100 percent 
to around 85 percent.8  However, these figures do not take into account the large and 
growing proportion of customer service, sales, and technician jobs performed by third-
party subcontractors, which have lower union density and are typically not covered by 
collective agreements.   
In the absence of sectoral bargaining, works councils have assumed central 
responsibility for negotiating collective agreements in many new workplaces.  However, 
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works councils have not built strong working relationships with the union outside of 
DT’s fixed network business.  Works councilors at different locations in large firms often 
do not know each other due to frequent restructuring and membership in company-level 
works councils changes often as divisions are spun-off and as former competitors merge.  
Moreover, in diversified firms like Mannesmann or DT, works councils located in 
different business units often have distinct or conflicting interests (Höpner and Jackson 
2003; Sako and Jackson 2006).  
Market liberalization and corporate restructuring have thus contributed to the 
fragmentation of collective bargaining in the telecommunications industry.  Today DT 
faces competition across market segments from firms with weaker or no collective 
agreements.  Meanwhile, ver.di representatives are struggling to develop new approaches 
to regulating working conditions in a more competitive sector, without the institutional 
moorings of a sectoral bargaining structure or a common framework agreement at DT.  
 
3. Employment systems 
The changes in the German telecommunications market discussed above have 
encouraged managers to reorganize work and adopt new strategies of performance 
management.  As markets reach saturation, both DT and its competitors are increasingly 
focused on customer attraction and retention, providing incentives to invest in employee 
skills and service quality.  However, growing price-based competition and declining 
profit margins create potentially conflicting pressures to reduce labor costs through lean 
staffing practices and outsourcing strategies.  New technologies have increased the 
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complexity of many jobs, but also facilitate rationalization, routing of calls to remote 
locations, and individual performance monitoring.   
Growing fragmentation in industrial relations and more differentiated markets 
provide greater scope for managers to exercise strategic choice. At the same time, large 
firms continue to have elected works councils, which enjoy strong co-determination and 
consultation rights.  Most telecommunications employees also continue to receive 
vocational training through the German ‘dual’ apprenticeship system, in which employers 
hire apprentices in a particular trade at a lower rate of pay and partially fund their 
classroom training.  This, in turn, affects overall skill levels and skill transferability, as 
well as professional or occupational identity.   
In the following sections, I examine how these institutions have influenced 
employment practices in two major areas of telecommunications employment: 
technicians and customer service and sales workers.  The summary here draws primarily 
on case study data from Deutsche Telekom’s two largest business units, T-Com (fixed-
lined) and T-Mobile (wireless); and by two of its major competitors, Arcor (fixed-line) 
and Vodafone Germany (wireless) – both of which are owned by the British 
multinational Vodafone.   
 
Technicians. Technicians are responsible for constructing and maintaining 
networks, both for private customers and large businesses; as well as installing and 
repairing lines and services.  DT owns most of Germany’s infrastructure (83 percent of 
telephone channels in 2006), which is then leased or resold by competitors; and its 
technicians are responsible for maintaining and servicing both this fixed network and a 
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large proportion of Germany’s wireless network.  Even where competitors own their own 
network, DT typically services the ‘last mile’ or connection between the distribution 
point and the customer.   
DT’s technicians have traditionally been organized on a regional basis, with 
responsibility for maintaining both the fixed and wireless network infrastructure.  There 
are four main job categories: Monteur handle simple connections and product assembly; 
Service Monteur/Techniker are responsible for maintenance and repair; and Service 
Techniker Spezial build and maintain large business networks. Almost all of these 
employees have completed apprenticeship training in the Systemelektroniker/in trade; 
and most received their training at DT.  
  Technicians responsible for installation, maintenance, and repair (Technische 
Aussendienst) represent the largest group of technical employees at DT.  The 
organization of these jobs changed over the 1990s, due to new technologies facilitating 
tracking and distribution of jobs.  Previously supervisors would meet employees each 
morning to distribute assignments; while today all job assignments are allocated over the 
internet through personal laptops.  Employees primarily work alone, meeting with 
‘virtual teams’ of 17 to 20 technicians at least once a month to discuss team goals and to 
receive training on new products.  DT has introduced team competitions, but these are 
optional and have not been attached to bonuses, pay at risk, or disciplinary measures.  
Employees also have working time accounts and flexible working hours, allowing them 
to start up to half an hour early and to work up to 10 hours per day.  Additional hours are 
accumulated in their account, and technicians negotiate individual plans with team 
leaders for ‘drawing down’ this account by the end of the year through reduced hours.  
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All of these changes were negotiated with strong works councils, which have resisted the 
introduction of pay-at-risk and ensured that individual technicians maintain broad control 
over their working time arrangements. 
DT’s technicians have thus traditionally enjoyed considerable autonomy, with few 
substantive consequences or incentives attached to meeting performance goals.  
However, this is changing.  DT is introducing GPS tracking systems, and is in 
negotiations with its works councils over whether this technology can be used to monitor 
the movements of individual technicians.  A recent collective agreement with ver.di will 
introduce 15 percent pay at risk for the first time, and management is also seeking to 
change works agreements that specify that supervisors can only look at team results to 
facilitate individual performance evaluation.  According to a recent ver.di agreement, the 
time employees spend driving to their first assignment and home from their last 
assignment will not be included in employees’ official working hours, which will 
increase actual working hours for technicians in several regions.  At the same time, works 
councilors felt that it would be difficult for managers to implement unilateral changes in 
these areas, and were optimistic that compromises could be reached. 
 
Customer Service and Sales. Service and sales jobs – primarily in retail stores 
and call centers – have become more important as a strategic channel for attracting and 
retaining customers.  These jobs are expanding at all telecommunications companies, but 
make up a larger proportion of employment at DT’s major competitors, particularly 
among service resellers that do not maintain their own infrastructure.   
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Formal vocational training continues to be important for recruitment and 
promotion in service and sales jobs, although this varies across firms.  DT offers an 
apprenticeship in retail sales, or ‘Kaufleute im Einzelhandel,’ in its retail subsidiary T-
Punkt, which represents 16 percent of its total apprentice places.  While other firms offer 
this training, they do so at a lower rate, and typically adjust the number of new apprentice 
places based on their recruitment needs.  Call center agents at DT traditionally completed 
the apprenticeship training ‘Kaufleute für Bürokommunikation’ (Management Assistant 
in Office Communications), which was not specific to call centers, thus offering mobility 
to other jobs in the company and sector.  Its competitors and call center subcontractors, in 
contrast, tended to recruit employees from a variety of backgrounds, with a heavy 
reliance on students; and many did not fund apprenticeship training.  In 2006, a new call 
center apprenticeship, ‘Kaufleute für Dialogmarketing,’ was negotiated between ver.di, 
the DGB, and the employers’ organization Kuratorium der Deutschen Wirtschaft für 
Berufsbildung (KWB), with the cooperation of several large call center vendors.  
According to union representatives, close to 90 percent of training for the new 
apprenticeship takes part in the firm, making it less costly than other apprenticeship 
courses that involve more extensive classroom training.  Employers have argued that the 
new apprenticeship will help to raise the status of call center work and improve skill 
portability.  However, union and works council representatives at DT felt it represented a 
devaluing of the broad skills provided in the previous Kaufleute apprenticeship, and 
would serve to further segregate call center agents and reduce mobility within DT. 
 Call centers have also been a central focus of work reorganization measures.  New 
technologies have made it easier to route calls between remote locations and to 
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subcontractors, match agent availability with fluctuating call volume, and monitor agent 
performance.  These jobs also represent a large proportion of employment, averaging 
around 30 percent of jobs in the largest companies, and thus provide an obvious target for 
reducing labor costs.  Although the companies studied here –T-Com, T-Mobile, Arcor, 
and Vodafone – have adopted different practices, all four have moved towards a similar 
employment system that relies on worker skill and discretion to improve flexibility and 
motivation.   
 First, all four companies have trained employees to handle a variety of call types.  
In 1999, T-Com retrained agents to handle a range of billing, sales, complaints, 
telemarketing, and service calls.  T-Mobile also gradually reduced specializations, 
although maintaining dedicated groups for high- and low-value customer segments.  
Arcor and Vodafone had more specializations, but pay and working conditions were not 
differentiated based on call type and mobility across jobs was high.  These changes 
increased the complexity of call center jobs, in some cases allowing union representatives 
to argue for increased pay; were associated with low wage spread; and allowed managers 
to distribute calls more flexibly between locations and agent groups. 
Second, all of the companies adopted scheduling arrangements that provided 
managers with more flexibility to adjust employment levels to daily and seasonal 
fluctuations in call volume, while giving workers some control over their working time.  
T-Com and T-Mobile negotiated working time accounts with their works councils in the 
early 2000s, which allowed employees to build up hours in their accounts when call 
volume was high, and then draw down those hours when they needed extra time off.  
Employee control over these arrangements was strongest at T-Com: works agreements 
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specified that team leaders could not force agents to work overtime or prevent agents 
from leaving when they chose if they had sufficient ‘plus’ hours.  As a result, team 
leaders relied on maintaining a good relationship with their team to avoid staffing 
problems.  Arcor and Vodafone did not have working time accounts, but this was in part 
due to works councils’ perception that managers would take advantage of these 
arrangements.  At Arcor, the works council had gradually improved scheduling 
predictability and helped individual workers to secure favorable shifts based on needs 
such as child care; while Vodafone employees were able to refuse requests by managers 
to change their shifts.  
Third, new performance management practices focused on ‘soft’ forms of 
motivation through coaching and training rather than discipline and dismissals.  Works 
councils placed strict, negotiated limits on individual monitoring and incentives.  These 
limits were strongest at T-Com and T-Mobile, where works agreements prohibited 
managers from recording individual performance metrics, disciplining individual workers 
based on their performance, or basing variable pay on individual sales goals.  At Arcor, 
works agreements also prohibited individual monitoring, with the exception of call 
length; and ‘mystery calls’ evaluating service quality were reported only at the team 
level.  Vodafone allowed mystery calls to be reported at the agent level, but individual 
results were only available to several ‘trainers’ at each center who could only use this 
data to give employees feedback and coaching.  Coaching was described by managers 
and works councilors as a negotiation rather than evaluation, as team leaders were 
restricted in threatening hard consequences, such as dismissal, to poor performers.   
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Fourth, all four companies adopted team-based work organization and incentives 
– encouraged in large part by these negotiated limits on individual monitoring.  At T-
Com and T-Mobile, evaluations of team performance determined the distribution of 
variable pay.  At T-Com, this was overseen by a committee at each workplace with an 
equal number of employee and employer representatives.  In addition, sales goals for 
each team were incorporated into a collective agreement, and employees were able to 
appeal these goals before a joint committee.  Teams at Arcor’s call centers were 
responsible for providing ‘team reports’ that identified group goals and suggestions for 
improving systems.  Employees in each team were assigned a coaching role, and variable 
pay was distributed by team leaders as a bonus on top of base pay.  At Vodafone, teams 
had weekly and monthly sales goals, and managers organized special team competitions 
and bonuses.  At all of the firms, there was a strong focus on building ‘team spirit’, with 
regular team meetings, workshops, and training sessions, as well as activities planned 
together outside of work.   
These employment practices reinforced one another: limits on monitoring, 
combined with broad employee control over their working time, made it difficult to 
pursue individualized, discipline-based strategies for motivating workers.  Employees 
adopted a more professional attitude towards their jobs, encouraged by their broad 
autonomy and often a strong ‘occupational identity’ fostered by apprenticeship training in 
a sales or administrative profession.  Works councils played an important role in placing 
these negotiated limits on the possible range of management practices, as well as 
ensuring some fairness in the implementation of new incentives such as variable pay.   
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Participatory practices were further supported by high and uniform wage levels 
and job security, secured through collective bargaining with ver.di at DT and IG Metall at 
Arcor and Vodafone.  Union agreements were strongest at T-Com, with higher pay across 
call center jobs and provisions that made it virtually impossible to lay off workers.  
However, union agreements at the other companies had also helped to reduce internal 
inequality and raise overall pay, collapsing often complicated structures of individual 
contracts and varied pay grades that were the legacy of mergers and spin-offs into a more 
simple structure with less variation.  For example, Arcor was formed by a series of 
mergers between o.tel.o, germany.net, and a number of smaller city carriers.  In 2003, IG 
Metall and Transnet finally concluded a collective agreement for the company’s new call 
center subsidiary that collapsed 16 different employment contracts from these mergers 
into two contracts, while ensuring that no employees were assigned a lower pay grade.   
 
4. Organizational restructuring 
The above discussion suggests that worker representatives continue to play an important 
role in encouraging German telecommunications employers to invest in employment 
systems that rely on worker skills and involvement for improving productivity.  However, 
in recent years, employers have also adopted a parallel set of externalization strategies 
that allow them to differentiate these systems across their production network.  
Outsourcing and subsidiary strategies are two increasingly popular organizational 
restructuring measures that involve shifting some portion of core work – or, alternatively, 
entire departments or establishments – to a different ‘owner,’ thus entailing a 
renegotiation of employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements.  These 
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organizational changes contribute to increased variation in pay and working conditions 
and declining coordination between works councils across establishments.9   
 
Outsourcing. Large telecommunications firms rely on third-party subcontractors 
to perform technician, retail, and call center work.  DT traditionally used subcontractors 
to handle peaks in demand for technicians, but increasingly uses them for regular work.  
For example, in Nordrhein-Westfallen, the company’s largest administrative region, DT 
employs 1,800 in-house technicians and 1,200 external technicians through its 
subcontractors.  These subcontractors are used primarily to handle simple jobs, such as 
installation; are not used for large business accounts; and are more likely to be assigned 
to jobs ordered from competitors who resell services on DT’s network.   
The organization of retail establishments is more decentralized: large firms 
typically both own their own retail stores and rely on franchises or third-party chain 
stores to sell products and services.  DT owns 600 stores employing over 4,000 sales 
workers.  These were moved to a subsidiary, ‘T-Punkt,’ in 2004, but the new company is 
covered by a collective agreement and primarily employs workers with apprenticeship 
training in retail sales.  Employment is less regulated in the third-party stores that sell DT 
services, which are not covered by the DT agreement and tend to recruit more students or 
other employee groups that lack formal qualifications.  Vodafone Germany owns 240 of 
its own stores, but has over 1,000 franchises, or ‘partner stores,’ that employ close to 
3,000 employees and are not covered by Vodafone’s collective agreement with IG 
Metall.  
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A similar trend can be seen in call center operations.  Several companies, 
including T-Online and the mobile provider E-plus, have outsourced a majority or all of 
their call center work; while others outsource peaks in call volume or certain lower-
skilled jobs such as operator services.  T-Com outsourced most of its directory assistance 
jobs in the late 1990s and T-Mobile gradually increased the outsourcing of calls during 
late hours, peak times, vacations, night shifts, and outbound campaigns.  By 2007, 
according to DT works councilors, around 7,000 of T-Com’s call center jobs were 
performed by subcontractors.  During this same time period, Arcor increased outsourcing 
of call volume peaks, late nights, outbound campaigns, and all directory assistance work.  
Union officials estimated that close to 90 percent of Arcor’s ‘simple’ or transactional call 
center jobs were carried out externally, while managers retrained the internal workforce 
to focus on more complex technical service jobs and high value-added customer 
segments.   
Works councils and union representatives initially cooperated with these 
measures, as they were viewed as a useful escape valve for pressures to reduce labor 
costs or extend service to unsocial working hours (Doellgast and Greer 2007).  For 
example, in 2000, Vodafone’s works council agreed to allow management outsource 
peaks in call volume and some telemarketing campaigns in exchange for strong job 
security protections.  However, outsourcing often created new and unexpected pressures.  
Vodafone began to outsource all new growth in call volume rather than expand 
employment in-house.  In-house workers are benchmarked against subcontractors, 
increasing pressure on works councilors to improve productivity and allow more 
individual performance monitoring. Ver.di negotiated a special agreement in 2006 with 
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T-Mobile that included pay at risk and reduced starting pay for new hires in call centers, 
following an emotional campaign in which management threatened to outsource all 
customer service jobs if the agreement was not accepted. 
The growing use of subcontractors for formerly core telecommunications jobs has 
moved thousands of these jobs to companies that are typically not covered by union 
agreements.  Only one large call center subcontractor, Walter Telemedien, had signed an 
agreement with ver.di, and this was considerably weaker than those that covered the 
workers of their major clients, including DT.  While large subcontractors often have 
works councils, they tend to be newer, to have weaker relationships with unions, and to 
have little contact with the works councils of client companies.  These companies also 
typically pay lower wages, monitor work more intensively, demand greater scheduling 
flexibility from their workers, and rely more heavily on commission and pay at risk.   
 
Subsidiary strategies. An alternative set of restructuring measures involves 
moving internal departments or entire job categories to subsidiaries.  Similar to 
outsourcing, this constitutes a change in ownership, allowing firms to re-negotiate 
collective agreements.  Deutsche Telekom has been most aggressive in adopting this 
strategy – due in part to its size and limitations on other forms of externalization from 
strong job security agreements.  
In March 2004, DT established two new subsidiaries, Vivento Customer Services 
(VCS) and Vivento Technical Services (VTS), to handle lower skilled call center and 
technical support work across DT’s companies, as well as to provide subcontracted 
services to external clients.  These new businesses were formed due to DT’s unique 
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employment commitments.  Between 1995 and 2004, Deutsche Telekom cut 110,000 
positions in its core operations, largely through early retirement, voluntary buy-outs, and 
natural turnover.  Redundant employees who could not be accommodated through these 
measures were moved into Vivento Personal Service Agentur (PSA), a ‘temporary 
employment and qualification company’ or Beschäftigungsgesellschaft created in 2002 
that was intended to place employees in short-term assignments within and outside DT.  
By 2003, Vivento PSA had grown to close to 20,000 employees, who DT was obligated 
to maintain at their former pay level.   
VCS and VTS were established to target new markets using this surplus 
workforce, and over 4,000 employees were moved to the two subsidiaries from Vivento 
PSA.  Under the 2004 collective agreement, the new subsidiaries remained under the DT 
agreement, although pay was reduced to 91.25 percent of employees’ former salaries.  
While employees transferred from other DT companies were able to keep their 
employment contracts, new employees were hired under less favorable terms.  For 
example, the starting monthly salary at VTS was 1,900 Euros in 2006 compared to 2,300 
Euros for T-Com’s in-house technicians.  By 2007, DT was contracting a portion of its 
‘outsourced’ call center and technical service work to VCS and VTS.   
Ver.di representatives were initially optimistic that the creation of the new 
Vivento companies would allow the company to in-source thousands of jobs that had 
been outsourced to vendors.  However, management soon made it clear that it intended to 
sell these subsidiaries to different vendors.  In 2006, DT transferred five of its 19 VCS 
locations, representing around 700 employees, to the subcontractors Walter Telemedien 
and Arvato.  Employees’ pay and working conditions were secured through 2008, but 
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after that time the new employers will seek to renegotiate contracts at a level that are 
more in line with standards in the call center vendor industry.   
Then, in 2007, DT announced plans to shift 50,000 of its technical service, 
technical infrastructure, and call center jobs into three new subsidiaries, under the name 
of ‘T-Service,’ and demanded the renegotiation of pay and working conditions.  Ver.di 
led a six week strike – the first in the history of the company – with strong support from 
its membership.  Under the agreement eventually reached by both parties, wage levels for 
current employees will be reduced by 6.5 percent over 42 months and working time will 
increase from 34 to 38 weeks without pay compensation, amounting to more than a 10 
percent overall reduction in compensation.  In addition, new employees will earn 30 
percent below the current level; the use of variable pay will increase, with 15 percent of 
base pay tied to DT’s organizational performance and individual and team performance 
targets; and the regular working week will now include Saturdays in call center 
operations.  Management agreed to extend job security until 2012, to not sell the new 
service subsidiaries until 2010, and to offer 4,150 jobs at T-Service to DT apprentices.   
An important factor in ver.di’s decision to return to negotiations was 
management’s threat to transfer employees to the new companies without a collective 
agreement, which it had the right to carry through under German law.  This less favorable 
outcome was avoided.  However, differences in pay and working conditions will increase 
between divisions and between current and new employees.  In addition, works councils 
with different cultures will be obligated to develop a new structure for decision-making 
and communication.  Call center jobs from both T-Com and T-Mobile will be moved into 
the new customer service subsidiary – and while T-Com’s works councils are organized 
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on a regional basis and dominated by ver.di members, T-Mobile’s works councils have a 
workplace-based structure and weaker links to ver.di.  Works councilors anticipate that 
integrating these different cultures will generate conflict in the short-term and divert 
resources from negotiations over substantial planned changes in work organization. 
 
Conclusions 
 The liberalization of the German telecommunications market in the 1990s has 
contributed to the fragmentation of collective bargaining, the decline of union bargaining 
power, and growing variation in employment systems within and across firms.  These 
developments are particularly striking when measured against the industry’s recent 
history of centralized and coordinated bargaining.  The DPG and DT’s works councils 
relied on these institutions to preserve their influence over strategic decision-making and 
regulatory reform, which allowed them to guide incremental adjustment to new 
technologies and more competitive markets in the 1980s and 1990s (Darbishire 1997).   
This institutional advantage quickly unraveled following new regulations that 
encouraged competition across segments, led by firms with weaker or no union 
agreements.  While the DPG and now ver.di have sought to establish closer relationships 
with works councils in new firms, they face considerable obstacles from lack of interest 
or cooperation from new employers, competition between unions, and low membership 
density in new industry segments.  Today, collective bargaining in the German 
telecommunications industry occurs at the company level, even within the DT corporate 
group; while works councils have displaced unions as the primary, or only, form of 
collective representation in DT’s competitors.  Meanwhile, managers are reorienting their 
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competitive strategies to growing price-based competition, more differentiated markets, 
and increased pressure to maximize shareholder value. These trends have transformed 
many of the distinctive institutions that were viewed as supports for DT’s past ‘labor-
mediated’ restructuring strategies (Darbishire 1997).   
Findings contribute to contemporary debates on stability or change in Germany’s 
‘coordinated’ institutions (Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005).  Based 
on research in German manufacturing workplaces in the 1980s, Streeck (1991) and 
Turner (1991) argued that sectoral bargaining with strong unions, workplace level co-
determination, and vocational training emphasizing polyvalent skills provided productive 
constraints on firms that promoted social peace while enhancing corporate performance.  
More recent research on national varieties of capitalism has further emphasized the 
complementarity between these institutions and Germany’s distinctive bank-based 
finance and stakeholder corporate governance arrangements.  Hall and Soskice (2001), 
among others, have argued that German firms rely on non-market forms of coordination 
to sustain competitive advantage in high quality markets, giving employers incentives to 
cooperate with coordinating institutions.   
Recent evidence suggests that broad trends of internationalization and 
liberalization of markets are undermining these advantages and constraints.  German 
firms are orienting themselves toward the interests of shareholders, in response to the 
growing proportion of individual shareholders and shareholder activism by international 
institutional investors (Höpner 2003).  Union density and bargaining coverage have 
declined across sectors, employers associations are losing members, and concessionary 
plant-level bargaining has increased (see, e.g. Doellgast and Greer 2007: 57-58).  These 
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developments raise the question of how (if at all) persistent differences in national 
institutions influence firms’ strategic choices under conditions of market liberalization 
and declining union power.   
Telecommunications provides an important case study for examining the role of 
relatively ‘sticky’ collective bargaining arrangements in large firms as they face 
increased price-based competition and enjoy growing opportunities to escape existing 
constraints on managerial prerogative.  If the maintenance of strong industrial relations 
institutions depends on their complementarity with quality-focused competitive 
strategies, we might expect employer defection from these arrangements in the face of 
new pressures.  At the same time, firms may continue to benefit from strong coordinating 
institutions, particularly as they seek to gain worker acceptance for, and cooperation with, 
new measures that radically reorganize core jobs.   
Recent developments in the German telecommunications industry suggest that 
national industrial relations and vocational training institutions continue to play an 
important, but increasingly circumscribed, role in shaping management strategy and 
worker outcomes.  First, for large employers’ in-house workforce, national labor laws 
provide distinct forms of bargaining power in negotiations over work reorganization.  
Works councils’ co-determination rights have allowed them to substantively participate 
in decisions concerning compensation, work design, performance management, and 
scheduling, encouraging management to adopt employment practices that rely on worker 
skill and participation while safeguarding discretion.  Employers, in turn, have benefited 
from the cooperation of worker representatives with new employment systems that 
provided both flexibility and high levels of worker effort and commitment. 
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  However, a second trend of organizational restructuring through outsourcing and 
subsidiary strategies means that these favorable terms are increasingly circumscribed to a 
shrinking group of core workers.  Even within Deutsche Telekom, the use of 
subcontractors has increased and the shift in the locus of collective bargaining to the 
company-level has contributed to the increased variation in employment systems within 
the corporate group.  DT’s recent decision to establish separate service subsidiaries with 
lower pay scales and increased pay at risk will exacerbate these differences.  Works 
councils’ ability to build countervailing power depends on their success at establishing 
and maintaining coordinated bargaining structures within large firms and across their 
increasingly decentralized production chains.  Absent strong unions and centralized 
bargaining, the likelihood is greater that competition between locations for investment 
will undermine works councils’ ability to maintain strong agreements that preserve high 
pay and broad employee discretion.   
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Table 1: Major wireless providers (2006) 
 
Wireless 
Providers Ownership 
Subscribers 
(Millions) 
% of Total 
Subscribers
Revenue 
(Billions 
of €) 
Number of 
Employees 
Union 
agreement 
T-Mobile DT (Germany) 34.3 38% 8.2 5,700 ver.di 
Vodafone Vodafone (UK) 31.6 35% 8.0 9,000 IG Metall 
E-plus KPN Mobile (Netherlands) 13.6 15% 2.9 2,200 None 
o2 Telefónica (Spain) 11.6 13% 2.8 4,700 IG BCE 
Source: Company web sites, annual reports, and interviews.  Subscriber numbers reflect current as of June 
2007; Revenue and Employees from end of 2006 
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Table 2: Major fixed-line providers (2006) 
 
Provider Ownership 
DSL 
subscribers 
(Thousands) 
Voice 
subscribers 
(Thousands)
Revenue 
(Millions 
of €) 
Number of 
Employees 
Union 
agreement 
T-Com DT (Germany) 10,300 42,200 21,835 86,315 ver.di 
Arcor Vodafone (UK) 2,081 2,100 2,126 3,735 Transnet/ IG Metall 
Freenet Freenet (Germany) 1,000 3,040  2,055 3,646 None 
Versatel Versatel (Germany) 503 90 666 1,395 ver.di 
Source: Company web sites, annual reports, and interviews.  Subscriber numbers reflect current as of June 
2007; Revenue and Employees from end of 2006 
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Table 3: Selected company agreements in telecommunications, 2006 
 
Responsible trade union Company agreement 
Transport, Service and Networks Union 
(Transport, Service, Netze -- Transnet) 
Arcor 
Chemicals, Energy and Mining Union 
(Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau Chemie Energie 
-- IG BCE) 
O2, British Telecom 
Metalworkers' Union (Industriegewerkschaft 
Metall -- IG Metall) 
Vodafone, Arcor 
Service Employees’ Union 
(Vereintedienstleistungsgewerkschaft -- ver.di) 
Deutsche Telekom (Deutsche Telekom AG, T-Mobile, T-
Systems Business Services, T-Systems Enterprise 
Services, Vivento Customer Services, Vivento Technical 
Services, T-Punkt, DeTeImmobilien, T-Service, and other 
agreements for smaller subsidiaries); Versatel, EWE 
TEL, NetCologne, DOKom, Kabel Deutschland, Kabel 
Baden-Württemberg 
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Endnotes 
 
1 By the end of 1998 there were already over 120 licenses for voice telephony.  By the end of 1999, 262 
licenses for voice telephony services had been awarded to operators with their own networks and 365 
licenses for transmission lines, with a total of 1,700 companies providing telecommunications services in 
Germany.  In 2004, the number of licensees had grown to 875 with around 2,200 telecommunications 
companies. (Deutsche Telekom Annual Reports, 1999; 2004) 
2 In Germany, only 0.5 percent of residents subscribed to cable broadband services and 16.4 percent to 
DSL; while in the US, 10.3 percent subscribe to cable broadband and only 8.5 percent to DSL (OECD 
2007) 
3 Deutsche Telekom employed 12,000 apprentices in 2006, with a regular workforce of 159,992 – thus, 
apprentices represented close to 8% of employment.  In comparison, Vodafone offered 300 apprentice 
positions with a regular workforce of 9,000, representing just 3% of employment. 
4 According to the German telecommunications association BITKOM, revenues from voice services were 
declining by 1 billion Euros per year by 2006. German companies generated 4.5% less revenues from 
fixed-line calls, while the mobile communications market grew by 2% (DT Annual Report, 2006: 81).   In 
2006, 10% of German households had a mobile phone, but no telephone service (Eurobarometer 2007).  
The volume of calls has changed, as well: in 1999, 92.4% of calls were from fixed networks, and 7.6% 
from mobile; while in 2006, 77.6% were from fixed networks, 19.2% mobile, 3% VoIP, and 0.2% cable 
(Bundesnetzagentur 2006: 65). 
5 DT’s competitors accounted for 48% of ‘call minutes’ in 2006 (Bundesnetzagentur 2006: 64).  However, 
DT continued to own and operate 83% of telephone channels (Bundesnetzagentur 2006: 58) 
6 Although in 2006 DT controlled 50% of the market for end-customers in DSL, Resellers (selling DT’s 
DSL lines under their own name) controlled 23% -- and a large portion of these revenues are returned to 
DT (Bundesnetzagentur 2006: 61) 
7DT reports a total of 159,992 employees in its German operations, of which 86,315 employees are in 
Broadband/Fixed Network (T-Com/T-Home) and 28,188 in Headquarters/Shared Services – leaving 45,489 
employees in the company’s other subsidiareis (DT annual report, 2006).  The Bundesnetzagentur (2006) 
estimates telecommunications employment in mid-2006 as 55,900 at DT’s competitors.   
8 The major telecommunications companies with collective agreements in 2006 included the DT group 
(159,992 employees), Arcor (3,735 employees), Vodafone (9,000 employees), O2 (4,700), Kabel 
Deutschland (2,700), Versatel (1,395), EWE TEL (950), NetCologne (700).  This represents close to 
183,172 employees covered by an agreement, out of total employment of 215,892.   
9 This section summarizes case study material presented in: (Doellgast and Greer 2007; Doellgast 
Forthcoming) 
